The defensive UFR was getting a little long so I thought I might pop out a chunk about Iowa’s heavy formation package, why Michigan was getting beat by it earlier in the game, how they adjusted, and how they caught Iowa trying to take advantage.

So Iowa finally has the ball moving after a stretch of 20/22 unsuccessful offensive plays, and gets to the Michigan 8 yard line, with 4th down and 3. Michigan broke through last drive to make it 21-3, and this drive has consumed almost 8 minutes of the 3rd quarter, so Iowa has to score to avoid going into the 4th quarter down three scores without the ball.

This was the result:

Let’s talk about how they did that.

[After THE JUMP]

The Damn Bootlegs:

The Hawkeyes’ main offensive strategy, since they wanted to stay the hell away from anything involving an Aidan Hutchinson or David Ojabo pass rush, was to run stretch zones, isos, and split zones out of heavy personnel, like so:

The passing counter for that is a bootleg, IE a rollout the opposite direction with a flood or three-levels read. Twice today they have gained 20+ yards by running bootlegs out of this look, rolling away from the stretch action. It’s a very 1990s concept but it still works, because the whole idea is stretching the defense’s responsibilities between the sidelines.

Iowa’s bootlegs were strong against zone because they were able to swing four levels of threat (TE/TE/WR/QB) to a three levels of zone. Also Michigan’s linebacker level was overreacting to the stretch action left, allowing the receiving threats to win the race to the right. Watch Josh Ross (#12) here. He’s the bottom LB on the 30 yard line, and his zone gives him responsibility for the TE who crosses behind him:

I marked Ross down for that in UFR, but I also understand why he was playing coverage that way, because the QB is still a threat to take off, and his contain is gone as it’s all Jaylen Harrell can do to keep up with a wide receiver in the flat. Iowa has Michigan outmanned on the right side here because Michigan’s dead set on not giving up anything deep, committing Hill and Gray to Cover 3 zones that end up bracketing the Y with Turner and serving as a an extra help defender in case the run gets outside, respectively.

Michigan also tried man coverage, which at least matched numbers, but ran into the Ohio State 2018 problem. In the next example they motioned the F (the TE settling in at the top) across the formation, caught man coverage, and then made Vincent Gray (CB at the bottom) go through everybody to keep up with a receiver sprinting to the other side:

You don’t need arrows to figure out what happened to Gray there. Watching this I yelled at Harrell to chip the receiver before trying to pressure the quarterback; I later learned he was supposed to, fwiw.

Iowa would use motion before the snap to see how the defense reacts, and that would clue in Petras (and later Padilla) as to which guy was likely to spring open.

Stopping the Bootlegs

By the 4th drive, Michigan had adapted. Not only were they having the edge guy chip the WR as he came across, but shifting responsibilities on the defensive line. Instead of putting Harrell in a position where he’s got to leave the QB unpressured to cover the crossing receiver, they gave that job to a DT, IE Kris Jenkins, #94, second from bottom of the formation here:

Michigan was able to get away with that and still remain sound against a run by having the two inner DTs slant and Hutchinson step upfield to create a hard edge. If this is a stretch run to the left they’re now a bit weak in the C gap, but as long as Hinton’s slant gets him into the LG so they can’t scoop him, there’s not going to be much space in that gap once it reaches Hutchinson, who’s probably going to dominate the LT to such a degree that there’s nowhere to go.

Verus a pass, it results in a three-man rush, with the WLB (Hill-Green in this case) tagging the RB in case of a throwback screen (scissors). But back to the frontside: the tap that Jenkins gives Iowa WR#10 isn’t a big one, but it’s crucial. Note how the play ends: DJ Turner II had to track that WR all the way across the field to make a play at the sideline. Any yards this gets can be found in how delayed Turner is, and any delay in the receiver’s path to the sideline goes right into that equation. But he wasn’t the only guy out there: Harrell was out in the flat as well.

If they didn’t get a crosser, Harrell was free to blitz. Earlier in the game he was taking a path to the RB but as soon as he started watching the ball, the rollout without an immediate dumpoff option was off the table:

Not that it stopped the Ferentzes from trying again this same drive. Michigan had this pegged so well they had substituted Harrell for spacebacker Michael Barrett and let him use his speed to accelerate Padilla’s throw.

By the time this drive got down to the redzone it was time for Iowa to pull out a counter to what Michigan was doing.

The 4th Down Stop

Personnel: The Hawkeyes did this out of multiple formations but their favorite was the Heavy set: a fullback, two tight ends, and one receiver. The tight ends are to either side of the formation, and the fullback gives them an opportunity to attack either side in force.

Michigan was answering just about everything that wasn’t spread (1 RB, 1 TE, 3 WRs) with with 5-2-4 personnel. In the screenshot above they have DTs Jenkins, Smith, and Jeter, OLBs Hutchinson and Harrell, ILBs Ross and Hill-Green, and then Hawkins, Hill, Gray, and Turner. This ought to give Iowa an advantage on power runs since one of the DBs is likely to get a face full of fullback. Michigan should have the advantage on passes—Gray gets a tight end but he’s big enough that he shouldn’t be easy to body.

Iowa’s Play: The Ferentzes want to run a mesh with the tight ends, delaying the Y’s release then rubbing off his coverage with the F’s crossing route, and vice versa. The Y is supposed to interfere with Hawkins (#2) while the F does the same to Gray.

Ideally, in their minds, Harrell is going to be caught defending the edge of a run, but really they’re expecting him to be stepping up then blitzing. The play is to quasi-roll Padilla away from that so he has plenty of time to look off the coverage on the frontside, then come back to the Y with Vincent Gray late because of traffic.

What they got was brackets on both tight ends. Sorry there are so many lines, but there was a lot of traffic:

The Z is single-covered but Turner set up with outside leverage on an out-breaking route so that’s dead. The only other options are the tight ends, but Michigan had both of them bracketed between a guy in man (Gray and Hawkins) and a zone defender (Harrell and Hill) he’s walking right into, plus Josh Ross on the fullback, who then drops to a middle zone to make sure there are no gaps when someone gets rubbed off as soon as he sees the FB is part of the protection scheme. Hill-Green is blitzing. Just as they did with the WR crossers, Hill-Green also makes sure to bump the RB on his way in, ensuring his buddies have plenty of time to rally in the case of a dump-off.

Finally, Michigan ran a stunt with Hutchinson and Jeter, though Jeter fell down.

Takeaways?

I think it’s safe to say Michigan was prepared for this exact play, but note that all the elements of their defense versus the bootleg and the stretch zones were here as well. Can you guess where it was weak? Right here:

Because Turner set up outside to prevent a fade, that was going to cause him leverage issues—with no safety help over that—if the WR came inside. Hill stepped down on run action before getting to his overhang zone, which would have left Turner alone. This was also something that was visible pre-snap: I’ve been praising Cade McNamara all year for noticing keys like how Turner set up on the Z receiver. Michigan also has pre-snap sight reads in their offense to take advantage of that. Iowa, using a rotational quarterback under center, never gave themselves that opportunity. They gambled that Michigan would be in their “Let’s kill bootleg right” defense, their trail defenders would get rubbed off by some light interference, and the Ferentz Regime could claim another great tight end moment while cutting Michigan’s lead to two scores. Instead they got owned, and the blowout was on.