Previously: Part One, Part Two. If you're looking for the Rutgers preview it's here.

You're definitely going to want to at least read part two of this series, which explains the stats I'm using below and details the 2009-14 seasons, before moving on to the rest of this post. Ideally, you'll read part one, as well.

Now that you're caught up, let's get to it.

2014-15: Bad Wheels

Team Stats: 27.7% pick-and-rolls + passes (#36 in country), 0.911 points per play (#62)

The Ballhandlers:

	P&R Plays (Own Offense)	PPP on Own Offense (%ile)	P&R Plays (Passes)	PPP on Passes (%ile)	Total P&R Plays	Overall P&R PPP. (%ile)	Keep %
Spike Albrecht	65	0.815 (70%)	98	1.276 (92%)	178	1.092 (93%)	36.5%
Caris LeVert	87	0.644 (35%)	58	0.862 (34%)	145	0.731 (28%)	60.0%
Derrick Walton	52	0.635 (33%)	61	0.967 (54%)	113	0.814 (47%)	46.0%
Zak Irvin	60	0.783 (63%)	43	1.395 (96%)	103	1.039 (90%)	58.3%
MAAR	39	0.872 (79%)	19	1.737 (100%)	58	1.155 (96%)	67.2%

The Screeners:

	Pop Plays (%)	Pop PPP (%ile)	Roll Plays	Roll PPP (%ile)	Slip Plays (%)	Slip PPP (%ile)	Overall Plays	Overall PPP (%ile)
Max Bielfeldt	12 (36.4%)	1.167 (88%)	19 (57.6%)	1.000 (30%)	2 (6.1%)	2.000 (—)	33	1.121 (76%)
Ricky Doyle	1 (3.6%)	2.000 (—)	26 (92.9%)	1.308 (74%)	1 (3.6%)	0.000 (—)	28	1.286 (90%)
Zak Irvin	9 (69.2%)	1.222 (—)	—	—	4 (30.8%)	2.000 (—)	13	1.462 (96%)
Mark Donnal	1 (10%)	3.000 (—)	9 (90%)	1.556 (—)	—	—	10	1.700 (99%)

I almost didn't include this season or the next because of Michigan's injury issues, then decided it was useful to see what happens when a team's two best perimeter players get hurt in the same season.

While neither Caris LeVert nor Derrick Walton were producing particularly well in the pick-and-roll before their respective foot injuries, we saw later that these injuries delayed breakouts into effective players—Walton, in particular, eventually became a great P&R ballhandler.

The players that remained were effective but one-dimensional. Spike Albrecht drove to pass. Zak Irvin and Muhammad-Ali Abdur-Rahkman hunted shots off of screens. Irvin, defying reputation, struck the best balance between shooting and passing, and he was a very effective passer. Only MAAR was above-average at generating his own offense off of screens, though.

Derrick Walton's foot injury stunted a developing rapport with Ricky Doyle

Michigan was also working with a limited group of finishers. Ricky Doyle was the best roll man but was a roll man only. Max Bielfedlt(!) ended up with the most plays among screeners even though he was a 30th-percentile finisher on the roll; he salvaged decent efficiency with some pick-and-pop jumpers. If Zak Irvin was setting a screen, it was to pop or slip for a jump shot.

This marks the first season since 2008-09 that Michigan's pick-and-roll usage went down; they also slipped 40 spots in the efficiency rankings. This team was going to drop off with the departures of Nik Stauskas, Glenn Robinson III, and Jordan Morgan, then injuries made matters worse. Even if LeVert and Walton weren't high-level P&R ballhandlers at this point, their spot-up shooting could've helped.

Even with all that, Michigan's pick-and-roll offense ranked in the 83rd percentile by points per play. They weren't elite; they were still good. They just couldn't build the offense around it to the extent they had the previous year.

2015-16: Bad Wheels 2

Team Stats: 30.5% pick-and-rolls + passes (#22 in country), 0.923 points per play (#80)

The Ballhandlers:

	P&R Plays (Own Offense)	PPP on Own Offense (%ile)	P&R Plays (Passes)	PPP on Passes (%ile)	Total P&R Plays	Overall P&R PPP. (%ile)	Keep %
Derrick Walton	128	0.711 (44%)	120	1.000 (59%)	248	0.851 (51%)	51.6%
Zak Irvin	149	0.826 (68%)	98	1.306 (93%)	247	1.016 (86%)	60.3%
Caris LeVert	57	0.877 (77%)	62	0.855 (32%)	119	0.866 (54%)	47.9%
MAAR	67	0.910 (82%)	41	0.805 (24%)	108	0.870 (55%)	62.0%
Duncan Robinson	19	0.632 (29%)	17	0.647 (9%)	36	0.639 (14%)	52.8%

The Screeners:

	Pop Plays (%)	Pop PPP (%ile)	Roll Plays	Roll PPP (%ile)	Slip Plays (%)	Slip PPP (%ile)	Overall Plays	Overall PPP (%ile)
Mark Donnal	12 (21.8%)	0.500 (12%)	40 (72.7%)	1.250 (60%)	3 (5.5%)	0.667 (—)	55	1.055 (60%)
Ricky Doyle	1 (2.9%)	2.000 (—)	30 (88.2%)	1.200 (54%)	3 (8.8%)	0.333 (—)	34	1.147 (73%)
Moe Wagner	3 (15.8%)	1.667 (—)	16 (84.2%)	1.375 (77%)	—	—	19	1.421 (95%)
DJ Wilson	9 (64.3%)	0.556 (—)	4 (28.6%)	1.500 (—)	1 (7.1%)	0.000 (—)	14	0.786 (24%)
Zak Irvin	9 (81.8%)	1.000 (—)	—	—	2 (18.2%)	0.000 (—)	11	0.818 (27%)

An unfortunate repeat, as Walton's previous foot injury sapped his ability to finish at the rim and LeVert—who'd improved considerably as a scorer off the high screen—again lost most of the season to a bad wheel.

Beilein increased the volume past where it had been in 2013-14 and the team's PPP slightly increased, though they came out worse compared to the rest of the country. Irvin was easily the team's best P&R ballhandler, continuing to pass at a high level while making enough pull-up jumpers to be relatively effective as a scorer.

some of those jumpers were rather important

MAAR pulled off a tough feat, averaging more PPP using his own offense than when he passed; that's very much a good news/bad news situation.

The roll men remained limited. This was the year Ricky Doyle seemingly lost the ability to catch and finish, so Mark Donnal ended up as the primary screener. Neither graded out particularly well. The center who did: enigmatic freshman Moe Wagner, who scored well as a roll man and flashed the ability to pop out and hit jumpers.

[Hit THE JUMP for Michigan exploring that a bit more.]

Michigan's greatest P&R duo? [Campredon]

2016-17: Walton & Wagner

Team Stats: 29.1% pick-and-rolls + passes (#53 in country), 0.987 points per play (#22)

The Ballhandlers:

	P&R Plays (Own Offense)	PPP on Own Offense (%ile)	P&R Plays (Passes)	PPP on Passes (%ile)	Total P&R Plays	Overall P&R PPP. (%ile)	Keep %
Derrick Walton	149	0.933 (86%)	201	1.100 (75%)	350	1.029 (87%)	42.6%
Zak Irvin	169	0.805 (62%)	97	1.237 (89%)	266	0.962 (78%)	63.5%
MAAR	54	0.648 (31%)	32	1.031 (64%)	86	0.791 (36%)	62.8%
Zavier Simpson	13	0.923 (85%)	31	1.387 (96%)	44	1.230 (98%)	29.5%
Duncan Robinson	6	0.000 (—)	7	1.571 (—)	13	0.846 (50%)	46.2%

The Screeners:

	Pop Plays (%)	Pop PPP (%ile)	Roll Plays	Roll PPP (%ile)	Slip Plays (%)	Slip PPP (%ile)	Overall Plays	Overall PPP (%ile)
Moe Wagner	48 (53.9%)	1.375 (95%)	19 (21.3%)	1.211 (57%)	22 (24.7%)	1.364 (88%)	89	1.337 (90%)
Mark Donnal	8 (26.7%)	1.125 (—)	19 (63.3%)	1.316 (69%)	3 (10.0%)	2.000 (—)	30	1.333 (89%)
DJ Wilson	15 (51.7%)	1.533 (98%)	3 (10.3%)	1.333 (—)	11 (37.9%)	1.364 (88%)	29	1.448 (95%)

The bounceback year. While Irvin continued to be a steady producer (at least on the whole), Walton blew by him as a ballhandler because of his pull-up shooting and rapport with Moe Wagner, who broke out as a killer pick-and-pop threat with a good feel for when to roll/slip to the hoop.

Beilein actually kept things more straightforward this year, using a lower variety of screeners and ballhanders, but that's because he had little need to get weird. Donnal and DJ Wilson were both really effective behind Wagner—the chart above left me wondering what could've been with another season of Wilson despite the team's Final Four run in 2018. Walton and Irvin took on the vast majority of the ballhandling. While MAAR struggled, a freshman Xavier Simpson—before the spelling correction—graded out in the 98th percentile in limited work while looking to distribute on over 70% of his plays.

There wasn't a need to be tricky when the staple play—Wagner screening for Walton—had so much variation on its own. Whether Walton's man went over the screen or the defense switched, he could rise up for three when given an inch of space:

Switch a big man on him and he could disassemble your entire defense piece by piece before hitting an unguarded teammate if he hadn't already found an opening for a layup.

Of course, while Walton's shooting stretched defenses thin, nothing altered how an opponent had to approach Michigan as much as Wagner's skill at raining threes, catching and finishing, and even taking his man off the dribble. Wagner was capable of forcing one of the conference's best players off the court entirely with his outside shot:

Overplay the perimeter, though, and he'd slip to the basket in a flash, where what resistance he met was often too late to prevent a score. He'd even slip the screen and pop out to the three-point arc.

While this group didn't quite reach the heights as the 2012-13 team, they're right there with the Stauskas-led 2013-14 squad in usage and efficiency. In fact, they had the exact same 29.1% usage; the 2016-17 team ranked a lot lower nationally because the rest of the country started catching up in relying on ball screen offense.

2017-18: The Second Final Four Year Was Weird

Team Stats: 32.2% pick-and-rolls + passes (#42 in country), 0.907 points per play (#115)

	P&R Plays (Own Offense)	PPP on Own Offense (%ile)	P&R Plays (Passes)	PPP on Passes (%ile)	Total P&R Plays	Overall P&R PPP. (%ile)	Keep %
MAAR	152	0.875 (75%)	138	0.870 (32%)	290	0.872 (55%)	52.4%
Zavier Simpson	98	0.724 (43%)	158	1.127 (80%)	256	0.973 (78%)	38.3%
Charles Matthews	119	0.807 (60%)	105	1.181 (86%)	224	0.982 (80%)	53.1%
Jordan Poole	45	0.844 (70%)	36	0.861 (31%)	81	0.852 (50%)	55.6%
Jaaron Simmons	23	0.522 (13%)	28	1.071 (71%)	51	0.824 (42%)	45.1%

The Screeners:

	Pop Plays (%)	Pop PPP (%ile)	Roll Plays	Roll PPP (%ile)	Slip Plays (%)	Slip PPP (%ile)	Overall Plays	Overall PPP (%ile)
Moe Wagner	78 (60.9%)	0.923 (56%)	25 (19.5%)	1.560 (90%)	25 (19.5%)	1.200 (68%)	128	1.102 (65%)
Jon Teske	6 (15.8%)	0.000 (—)	26 (68.4%)	1.192 (50%)	6 (15.8%)	1.000 (—)	38	0.974 (45%)
Duncan Robinson	7 (41.2%)	0.857 (—)	—	—	10 (58.8%)	0.900 (33%)	17	0.882 (32%)

This is easily the worst P&R year under Beilein after he got things rolling other than the seasons his lead players got hurt—while the Wolverines upped their usage again, they fell outside the top 100 in efficiency for the first time since 2010. Michigan made the national championship game. Basketball can be strange.

The pieces didn't fit together well enough for this team to have a dominant offense. A sophomore Zavier Simpson, now with a 'Z', replaced Walton at point guard and continued to pass the ball very well, but he wasn't a scoring threat as a ballhandler and he killed spacing when he played off the ball. That also describes Charles Matthews, a better scorer who was more inclined to attack. Among the main ballhandlers, those two had the best marks as passers, but that's a little misleading—it helped that they weren't kicking the ball out to themselves.

MAAR tended to put his head down and go for glory

On the flip side, Michigan's best ballhandler scorers, MAAR and Jordan Poole, had bad passing stats that weren't entirely their fault—there was a ~50/50 chance their kickouts were going to someone shooting around 30% on three-pointers. The lack of spacing also impacted Wagner's chances to get open looks when he popped out for shots, which was a particularly big disappointment since he became an even better finisher at the rim. Jon Teske wasn't quite ready for prime time as a sophomore.

The offense as a whole fell from 4th in adjusted efficiency in 2016-17 to 35th in 2017-18. Thankfully, the arrival of Luke Yaklich propelled Michigan to a top-five finish on defense. Still, it's weird to look back at this team and see that they had more postseason success than the 2014 and 2017 teams, and even last year's squad.

Teske doesn't have Wagner's pop but he's a load on the roll [Campredon]

2018-19: This Is The Offense Now

Team Stats: 38.7% pick-and-rolls + passes (#4 in country), 0.989 points per play (#14)

The Ballhandlers:

	P&R Plays (Own Offense)	PPP on Own Offense (%ile)	P&R Plays (Passes)	PPP on Passes (%ile)	Total P&R Plays	Overall P&R PPP. (%ile)	Keep %
Zavier Simpson	155	0.742 (49%)	324	1.293 (93%)	479	1.115 (94%)	32.4%
Jordan Poole	118	0.898 (80%)	109	1.046 (69%)	227	0.969 (80%)	52.0%
Charles Matthews	103	0.660 (33%)	54	1.370 (96%)	157	0.904 (64%)	65.6%
Iggy Brazdeikis	55	0.927 (84%)	19	0.211 (0%)	74	0.743 (27%)	74.3%
Eli Brooks	28	0.679 (35%)	32	0.969 (53%)	60	0.833 (45%)	46.7%

The Screeners:

	Pop Plays (%)	Pop PPP (%ile)	Roll Plays	Roll PPP (%ile)	Slip Plays (%)	Slip PPP (%ile)	Overall Plays	Overall PPP (%ile)
Jon Teske	55 (39.9%)	0.927 (56%)	56 (40.6%)	1.482 (86%)	27 (19.6%)	1.481 (88%)	138	1.261 (84%)
Isaiah Livers	22 (66.7%)	1.409 (95%)	2 (6.1%)	0.500 (—)	9 (27.3%)	1.556 (—)	33	1.394 (93%)
Iggy Brazdeikis	13 (59.1%)	1.077 (72%)	1 (4.5%)	2.000 (—)	8 (36.4%)	1.375 (—)	22	1.227 (80%)

As Simpson came into his own as a point guard, Michigan returned to the days of having the best combination of usage and efficiency among high-major programs. Only Louisville and Virginia finished ahead of Michigan in PPP among high-major teams and neither had a rate of P&R plays above 25%; Michigan was at 38.7%, the highest mark among high-majors.

While still not a particularly effective scorer, Simpson added the sky hook to his repertoire, and he proved a genius distributor given teams played the pass against him. Poole stepped up his scoring again and improved dramatically as a passer, giving the team a reliable secondary ballhandler. Matthews lost his scoring touch but salvaged his efficiency by finding three-point shooters. Freshman Iggy Brazdeikis was excellent off the dribble but an atrocious passer. That worked out okay since Michigan funneled most of the possessions to their top three, particularly Simpson, who took on the most ballhandler possessions of any Wolverine since Trey Burke.

Simpson developed a beautiful rapport with Teske, now a strong finisher on rolls/slips and just enough of a pop threat to impact the way he had to be defended. Simpson had the perfect combination of patience and quickness—here he holds up in the midrange area before slipping a pass to Teske so fast you probably won't catch it the first time watching from this camera angle (sorry, I didn't make GIFs of last year so I tried to go through a game that was representative):

He could make that pass while holding the defense's attention because he'd already shown he could scoot by unsuspecting defenders for a layup if they didn't get between him and the rim earlier in the game.

Simpson also leveled up to advanced at manipulating the screen. From that same game, here he is turning down the pick knowing full well he's going to draw Isaiah Livers's defender. Even though three Gophers converge on Simpson, the ball is out before anyone is close enough to get a hand on it:

Teske aided Simpson's offense by becoming an expert at rescreening. Teske boxing the center out of the paint while Simpson or Poole slipped past for a layup was a common sight; while Teske's never used his size to be a dominant post scorer, he's been excellent at utilizing it in the screen game.

While Teske screening for Simpson was the bread and butter, Beilein incorporated plenty of variety. In going through these Minnesota highlights, I caught a Poole-Iggy pick-and-pop and Livers screening for a Matthews drive. Both Brazdeikis and Livers were productive secondary screeners whose jump shots opened up lanes for themselves and the ballhandler.

Take away the pick-and-roll and this wasn't a very good offense. Michigan ranked in the 34th percentile in transition, the 24th percentile on isolation plays, the 45th percentile on post-ups, and the sixth percentile on dribble handoff plays, per Synergy. The Wolverines were in the 96th percentile shooting on passes out of the pick-and-roll and the 94th percentile when the screener finished the play, however.

As a result, John Beilein did his best to make the whole plane out of the pick-and-roll. Combined with another elite defense, it was enough to get Michigan to 30 wins and a Sweet Sixteen appearance before they shot 1-for-19 from three against Texas Tech's top-ranked defense.

Beilein left for Cleveland in the offseason, leaving open the question of how Michigan's offense would change after transforming so much under his watch.

2019-20: Four Deep

Team Stats: 37.6% pick-and-rolls + passes (#9 in country), 0.969 points per play (#14)

The Ballhandlers:

	P&R Plays (Own Offense)	PPP on Own Offense (%ile)	P&R Plays (Passes)	PPP on Passes (%ile)	Total P&R Plays	Overall P&R PPP. (%ile)	Keep %
Zavier Simpson	209	0.746 (53%)	360	1.139 (85%)	569	0.995 (85%)	36.7%
David DeJulius	63	0.889 (81%)	73	0.986 (61%)	136	0.941 (78%)	46.3%
Eli Brooks	50	0.760 (57%)	75	1.080 (78%)	125	0.952 (79%)	40.0%
Franz Wagner	22	1.000 (93%)	15	1.000 (65%)	37	1.000 (88%)	59.5%
Isaiah Livers	22	0.727 (49%)	10	1.000 (65%)	32	0.812 (47%)	66.7%

The Screeners:

	Pop Plays (%)	Pop PPP (%ile)	Roll Plays	Roll PPP (%ile)	Slip Plays (%)	Slip PPP (%ile)	Overall Plays	Overall PPP (%ile)
Jon Teske	45 (40.5%)	0.911 (58%)	55 (49.5%)	1.382 (77%)	11 (9.9%)	0.818 (19%)	111	1.135 (73%)
Austin Davis	—	—	21 (100.0%)	1.476 (90%)	—	—	21	1.476 (96%)
Colin Castleton	5 (25.0%)	0.800 (—)	15 (75.0%)	1.267 (64%)	—	—	20	1.150 (75%)
Isaiah Livers	7 (63.6%)	1.714 (—)	—	—	4 (36.4%)	0.750 (—)	11	1.364 (92%)
Brandon Johns	6 (54.5%)	0.333 (—)	2 (18.2%)	2.000 (—)	3 (27.3%)	0.667 (—)	11	0.727 (18%)
Franz Wagner	2 (28.6%)	0.000 (—)	—	—	5 (71.4%)	0.000 (—)	7	0.000 (—)

I initially titled this section "Five Deep" when I started putting this series together but the last couple weeks haven't been good for Livers's pick-and-roll numbers. That said, Michigan has at least four players—Simpson, David DeJulius, Eli Brooks, and Franz Wagner—who they can reply upon to run ball screen offense at least as well as about 80% of the P&R ballhandlers in the country.

Otherwise, the particulars haven't changed since I went over them in great detail in part one. Juwan Howard introduced several NBA-style wrinkles to the pick-and-roll offense and made the double drag screen as much a staple offensive play as the more straightforward single high or side ball screens. Despite significant turnover (and injury time) on the wings and three undersized guards handling most of the plays, there's been almost no dropoff in efficiency while usage has remained level.

John Beilein laid a great foundation; Zavier Simpson and Jon Teske guaranteed there'd be a solid floor; Howard still deserves a lot of credit for the P&R offense's production.

TAKEAWAYS

the next Stauskas? [Campredon]

John Beilein was incredible. We knew this but it's amazing to quantify the way he transformed his own offense over the years to fit with the times and his teams. He hardly ran pick-and-roll at West Virginia or his first couple years at Michigan. Almost as soon as he made it the central play of his offense, however, no program in the country could boast M's consistent mastery of it in the years that weren't tanked by injury, and even those teams managed to be above-average at worst.

Juwan Howard might be, too. There's certainly some carryover from Beilein's teachings and the experience of Simpson and Teske. That said, the transition has been smoother than anyone expected and it's not from Howard copying Beilein's playbook. He's introduced a lot of his own stuff, including variations on the pick-and-roll, and it's worked well. The early signs are very good.

X is in the discussion. Nobody, not even Trey Burke, has taken on as many pick-and-roll plays in their time at Michigan as Simpson, whose 2018-19 season also stands above the rest in overall points per play.

	P&R Plays (Own Offense)	PPP on Own Offense (%ile)	P&R Plays (Passes)	PPP on Passes (%ile)	Total P&R Plays	Overall P&R PPP. (%ile)	Keep %
Simpson 19-20	209	0.746 (53%)	360	1.139 (85%)	569	0.995 (85%)	36.7%
Simpson 18-19	155	0.742 (49%)	324	1.293 (93%)	479	1.115 (94%)	32.4%
Walton 16-17	149	0.933 (86%)	201	1.100 (75%)	350	1.029 (87%)	42.6%
Stauskas 13-14	164	0.951 (85%)	113	1.319 (94%)	277	1.101 (93%)	59.2%
Burke 12-13	256	0.989 (92%)	231	1.117 (75%)	487	1.045 (91%)	52.6%
Morris 10-11	130	0.869 (73%)	120	1.250 (84%)	250	1.052 (87%)	52.0%

I'd still take Stauskas's 2014 and Burke's 2013 over either of the last two Simpson seasons because they needed less from their teammates to produce at an elite level. I'd give Burke the edge since he took on twice the workload as Stauskas and, incredibly, was a better scorer. If Burke had been afforded the same Jordan Morgan as Stauskas—if you remember the last post, Morgan was bad in 2013 and elite in 2014—his passing numbers would've been on the same level. You could hardly go wrong with any of the players on that list, however.

Times have changed. This is Michigan's year-by-year usage and efficiency in the P&R along with their national rank. You'll note that M's usage has skyrocketed; you can also see by how their rankings change that the rest of the country took on a whole lot more P&R offense over time, too.

	% Time P&R (Rank)	P&R PPP (Rank)
2019-20	37.2 (9)	0.970 (15)
2018-19	38.7 (4)	0.989 (14)
2017-18	32.2 (42)	0.907 (115)
2016-17	29.1 (53)	0.981 (24)
2015-16	30.5 (22)	0.923 (80)
2014-15	27.7 (36)	0.911 (62)
2013-14	29.1 (19)	0.987 (22)
2012-13	26.7 (19)	1.032 (2)
2011-12	23.8 (11)	0.975 (27)
2010-11	18.1 (37)	1.016 (17)
2009-10	9.7 (234)	0.802 (207)
2008-09	4.6 (285)	0.802 (180)
2007-08	7.0 (170)	0.694 (161)
2006-07	5.5 (142)	0.844 (72)

Efficiency hasn't spiked like usage, though the spike in usage probably helps explain that. Michigan has largely been the exception to the rule in being able to run it a ton while still being very efficient.

The future is bright. David DeJulius and Franz Wagner both have displayed promise running the ball screen this season. DDJ has taken on a point guard's style after formerly looking to score first; he's scored well and his passing numbers were good until Michigan's recent shooting funk. He's finding open players. He plays a lot like fellow Detroit native Walton—hard takes to the basket, dangerous pull-up jumpers, and solid decision-making.

Wagner, meanwhile, has some Stauskas to his game. While Stauskas is remembered for his shooting, he was also a crafty scorer around the basket, and Wagner has that same skill plus extra length. Franz hasn't been nearly on Stauskas's level as a shooter but the potential to get into the 35-40% range is apparent. Both are score-first players whose passing is underrated in part because their size makes finding passing lanes easier.

Although Wagner hasn't made a bucket as a screener yet, he's been used a little in Howard's double drag action as the pop threat while the center rolls to the rim. Livers has been utilized in the same role and it's created some wide open threes; Wagner should start hitting those looks before long, making him the rare player that can be effective on either end of the pick-and-roll.

The key for next season will be finding a big man. Austin Davis is great at rolling and rolling only; his limitations outside the pick-and-roll have been discussed at length here. Colin Castleton could get there if he adds enough strength; he's been solid this year but his matchups have mostly been cherry-picked. Brandon Johns could be a versatile pop/roll threat but he hasn't shown much so far. Freshmen-to-be Hunter Dickinson and Isaiah Todd, especially Dickinson, should factor in as well.