I have a problem with the way we measure penalties. The stats we use today are fine at communicating raw numbers in a digestible way; penalties per game, for example, is an effective estimate of how often a team’s discipline (or lack thereof) is affecting its success each game. They’re less fine, however, at comparing different teams’ relative ability to avoid penalties. 

In the available stats, we already recognize that college football teams play an uneven amount of games — because of bowl games, conference championships, and in 2020, COVID cancellations — by presenting the numbers in a “per game” format. Saying that in 2020 Notre Dame and Michigan committed 53 and 35 penalties, respectively, is useless for comparison, since the Irish played twice as many games; saying that they committed 4.42 and 5.83 penalties per game solves that problem. 

Here’s my gripe: Why do we stop there? In college football today, offenses vary widely in how quickly they snap the ball. Many teams hurry to the line and try to run as many plays as possible as quickly as possible, while others slow it down and try to milk the clock. Those teams that try to snap the ball more quickly will run more plays each game, and, naturally, that will create the opportunity for more penalties. Let’s say that, on average, two otherwise unrelated teams each commit offensive holding every 30 plays. If Team A runs 60 offensive plays per game, and Team B runs 90, then the stats will only say that Team A commits two holding penalties per game, while Team B commits three. Anyone reading those stats would conclude that Team B is committing holding penalties 50 percent more often, despite the fact they do it at the exact same rate! If your argument is that more penalties is a consequence that should be weighed in the decision to run a hurry-up offense, I’d counter that the defense would also have the opportunity to commit more penalties, so that effect is cancelled. 

[After THE JUMP: penalties per play]

Put simply, penalties (and penalty yards) per game is not an effective measure of a team’s discipline. To remedy this, I’ve converted all 127 FBS teams’ 2020 penalty stats into penalties per play and yards per play, available to view in this Google Sheet. In it, I’ve included the penalties per game rankings that the NCAA wants you to believe [adjusts tinfoil hat] as “P/G Rank” and my adjusted penalties per play rankings as “P/P Rank” (heh heh). I’ve also provided plays per penalty as a more understandable measure of penalty frequency, as well as a separate tab with numbers and rankings for penalty yards per play. 

Why do this? Michigan doesn’t move much on either sheet — they go from 59th in penalties per game to 55th per play, and from 83rd to 81st in penalty yards — so why go to all this trouble to reorganize an incredibly minor stat over a mostly semantic problem? Part of the reason is that I like to complain — especially about the NCAA — and this gives me an opportunity to do just that. 

The bigger reason, though, is that we love to build narratives out of incorrect or misleading facts. In the real world, that leads to some, uh, problems (for everyone’s sanity, please do not discuss these problems in the comments), but in sports, the narratives are mostly just annoying. For example, every time Michigan plays a military academy, we’re subjected to the narrative that the team will hardly commit any penalties, because, well, it’s a military academy, and the athletes there are disciplined! On a per-game basis, that appears true — all three academies rank in the top 20 in penalties per game. When considering penalties per play, though, each academy’s rank falls by double digits, and it’s easy to understand why: they all run a triple option and try to limit the other team’s snaps. As it turns out, the ability to stay disciplined during times of war — noble as it is — does not prevent defensive backs from grabbing jersey when they get beat. 

Michigan by the Numbers 

As expected, Michigan’s penalty numbers were … less than ideal. Let’s start with the (I guess) positives: the Wolverines were better than average at avoiding penalties, but just barely, coming in at 55th of 127. They committed 0.0411 penalties per play, or roughly one penalty every 24 plays, or even more roughly one every three drives. Obviously, penalties are not Michigan’s biggest problem — several notable teams, including Alabama and Ohio State, drew flags more frequently than the Wolverines did. 

What is striking, though, is the gap between Michigan’s penalties per play and penalty yards per play. Where the Wolverines were average at dodging flags, they were awful at avoiding serious penalties, coming in at 81st in penalty yards per play. That gap in rankings — 26 spots, to be exact — was fifth largest in the country, behind Georgia State, Illinois, Boise State, and USC. Effectively, that means Michigan’s penalties were the fifth most serious, or more technically, each flag drew the fifth most yards on average (9.86 yards, based on 35 penalties for 345 yards). 

It’s not hard to guess why that is: the defensive backs were overmatched, and they were forced to play physical with receivers as a result. In the Michigan State game alone, the Wolverines’ secondary combined for 50 yards worth of holding and pass interference penalties (I don’t have individual numbers for the whole season because those aren’t published and I’d rather not dig through the play-by-play of every last game). Especially at corner — and especially when those corners were left in one-on-one coverage — it became a choice between an almost sure touchdown and a likely penalty, when they could, those corners chose penalties. 

On the other end, the offensive line faced similar problems. The injuries that thinned out an already struggling young line created mismatches which, naturally, resulted in holding penalties. When putting those two factors together, and adding a few personal fouls, Michigan’s problem with committing penalties became a problem with giving up too many free yards on penalties. With an offense that struggled to sustain drives and a defense unable to stop them, high-yardage penalties made life that much more difficult. A rate of 0.4054 penalty yards per play means that, discounting opponents’ own penalties, the offense needs to gain a rough average of 1.5 extra yards every four downs, and the defense needs to keep opponents from gaining that same amount. In the Big Ten, the Wolverines are eighth-best in penalties per play and ninth-best in penalty yards per play. Especially for a rebuilding program, those numbers need to improve. 

How can Michigan solve it?

Obviously, it starts in the defensive backfield and on the offensive line. And frankly, as bad as last season was, it’s hard to see anything on the defense getting much better this year. Yes, Gemon Green and Vincent Gray will have another year under their belts, Steve Clinkscale seems like a promising hire to coach the DBs, and Mike Macdonald’s defense will presumably leave them on an island less often. At the same time, learning a new system takes time, the talent gap at CB will still be there, and the defensive line probably won’t provide much help pressuring the quarterback. Even with the year of development, the pass defense should still struggle mightily in 2021, and that will lead to more PIs. 

That being said, barring injuries, I do think there will be some progress on the offensive line. Yes, Jalen Mayfield is gone, but he was hurt for most of last season anyway, and there’s a decent amount of experience returning elsewhere on the line. Let’s keep expectations honest — this is a transitional year, and the line will be far from elite — but also look for positive steps forward and better discipline in protection. 

Beyond that, improvements in avoiding penalties get a little dicey. I would generally agree with the sentiment that penalty problems fall on the coaching staff. Coaches are absolutely responsible for enforcing discipline on the team, but discussion of how they can do that gets vague and unconvincing. For example, speaking strictly anecdotally, Michigan did seem to struggle with jumping offsides in 2020 (though the numbers indicate it was less of a problem than the long-yardage penalties were). Coaching that away isn’t easy; no matter how many times you tell players to “watch the ball,” sometimes they just don’t, and at the collegiate level, you can’t waste reps on “practicing” staying onside. 

Truthfully — and I hate this answer — it comes down to culture. It’s the same issue with avoiding personal fouls; just telling a player “hey, don’t commit personal fouls” isn’t going to stop him from taking cheap shots or pushing back when there’s beef after the whistle. Ultimately, coaches need to build a program where players recognize the consequences of their actions and know how to avoid flags on the field. I’ve never been involved in a college football program, so unfortunately I can’t contribute much on specifics, beyond the fact that it’s clear Michigan isn’t there yet.