OT: Happy Memorial Day/Favorite War Movie Thread

I agree with your statement about the

immense numerical advantages in raw material, weapons, and supplies and the raw courage and tenacity of the soldier, sailor, airman, and marine.

Of course, legends grow over time, but Patton's performance should be judged in relation to his peers. Of the northern (Montgomery) and Southern (Patton) flanks, I'd think it's fair to say the Southern performed better while being supplied as the lower-priority.

From page 4 of your link http://www.historynet.com/patton-the-german-view.htm/4

Patton, for his part, fully intended to make an unrelenting push to the Rhine after Normandy. He succeeded for a short time, brazenly gambling that the speed of his advance and Allied air superiority would keep the Germans too off balance to attack his unprotected flank. But Third Army’s advance was soon slowed by gasoline and ammunition shortages as Third Army reached the bank of the Moselle River, giving the Germans time to organize their defenses. Patton finally began receiving adequate supplies on September 4, after a week’s excruciating pause, and Third Army established a bridgehead across the Moselle on September 29—before halting again to wait for supplies. The fortress city of Metz did not fall until December 13, holding up Third Army long enough for the Germans to make an organized withdrawal behind the Saar River, setting the stage for the Battle of the Bulge.

The Germans, unaware of the Allies’ supply issues, credited their counterattacks throughout the withdrawal for Third Army’s seemingly hesitant advance. Lieutenant General Hermann Balck, who took command of Army Group G in September, thus did not think highly of Patton—or any other opposing commanders—during this time.

Meanwhile, Montgomery was pushing for the priority of Operation Market Garden in the north.  http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/battles_arnhem.html

In mid-August, Montgomery first raised the idea of changing Allied strategy to encompass a single thrust by his 21st Army Group, supported by the US First Army under Major General Courtney Hodges, through northern France, the Low Countries and into Germany. Montgomery's point was that there was not enough transport available at the moment to supply all three Army Groups going at full speed across a broad front. ...

The plan was firmly opposed by Bradley who believed that the Allies had won the Battle of Normandy in spite of Montgomery, as opposed to because of him. Now that final victory was in site, it was time for the Americans to take the lead. Also, such a plan would mean halting the American forces that had advanced the farthest from the Normandy beachhead - the US Third Army under Lieutenant General George S Patton Jr., Montgomery's old rival. Montgomery however, eventually persuaded Eisenhower that the 21st Army Group's thrust should have priority in supplies and that Bradley's US First Army, which would advance north of Aachen, should support it. In a letter to General George C Marshall, Eisenhower admitted to changing his "basic plan of attacking both north and east in order to help Montgomery seize tremendously important objectives in the northeast."

The plan consisted of

The overall Market Garden plan called for the First Allied Airborne Army to assist the rapid advance of the British Second Army from the Meuse - Escaut Canal to Nunspeet on the Zuider Zee (Ijsselmeer), a distance of around 100 miles (160km) and who would then turn east into Germany towards the industrial heartland of the Ruhr. A "carpet of airborne troops" would capture the road bridges over the major rivers and canals that lay along the route in three places: Eindhoven (around 13 miles / 20km from the start line), Nijmegen (53 miles / 85km) and Arnhem (64 miles / 100km), as well as a couple of smaller bridges at Veghel and Grave that lay between Eindhoven and Nijmegen. The route that XXX Corps (under Lt General B G Horrocks) would take (the formation that would head the British Second Army advance - the Garden part of the operation) was a tree-lined double-track road that ran across country that was almost entirely flat, consisted of sandy soil and polder (drained bogland) and broken by orchards, small woods, streams and ditches. All of this would make cross-country movement difficult and time-consuming.

 

For the airborne (Market) operation, as far as possible USAAF aircraft would fly the paratroopers while RAF aircraft would tow the gliders, for simplicity.The first wave of each division would land as a formed body around six miles (ten kilometres) from their objectives and then advance to capture them. The three divisions would have finished landing by the end of day three and each holding an all-round perimeter of over 25 miles (forty kilometres) allowing the ground forces to advance over them. Such timescales and distances only really made sense if there were an indication the Germans would put up little, if any, resistance.

Unfortunately, the assessment was not realistic and important intelligence regarding the presence of German tanks was ignored.

As Major Brian Urquhart, Chief of Intelligence British I Airborne Corps commented, "I simply did not believe that the Germans were going to roll over and surrender." There was poor coordination between SHAEF, 21st Army Group and the First Allied Airborne Army, which meant that although the overall estimated strength of the German forces was reasonably accurate, Allied intelligence lost the II SS Panzer Corps as it approached the Arnhem area. Most assumed that they had moved east, rather than stay in the general vicinity of Arnhem. Reports by the Dutch resistance and last minute aerial reconnaissance photographs indicated the presence of an armoured formation, as Major Brian Urquhart commented - "There, in the photos, I could clearly see tanks - if not on the very Arnhem landing and drop zones, then certainly close to them." These reports were however, dismissed all along the chain of command with the result being "the evaluation of intelligence on the Panzers in the Arnhem area was magnificently bungled." Major Urquhart was then visited by the Corps Medical Officer who suggested he take some sick leave.

In a nutshell, the result was that the land Garden forces could not advance anywhere near the planned timetable, and the glider-dropped Market forces could not hold on indefinitely.

Operation 'Berlin' (the evacuation of the Market forces) began that evening (Sept 25) with a sustained bombardment from 43rd (Wessex) Division and XXX Corps artillery while British and Canadian Engineers crossed the Lower Rhine to start ferrying the survivors of 1st Airborne back across the river. The wounded were left with a number of volunteers and the British retreated through a gap barely 700m wide. The evacuation proceeded until first light. The survivors of the division marched from Driel to Nijmegen where the seaborne tail of the division was waiting with clean uniforms and equipment. The Germans had occupied the pocket by 14.00 the next day and taken prisoner the troops who could not be moved. With the end of the evacuation, Operation Market Garden also ended.

Montgomery had the gall to deem the operation a 90% success, which was met with derision.

Montgomery estimated that the operation was ninety per cent successful but the failure to take the final objective, that of Arnhem Bridge, had nullified the whole thing. "My country can never again afford the luxury of another Montgomery success". (Bernhard, Prince of the Netherlands) "In return for so much courage and sacrifice, the Allies had won a 50-mile salient - leading nowhere." (Dr John C Warren)

In comparison, I'd say Patton looks pretty good. From your link again http://www.historynet.com/patton-the-german-view.htm/4

On December 16, 1944, Germany launched one of its last massive attempts to reclaim the destiny of the Third Reich. In the same blitzkrieg style that had served so well in France in 1940, the Germans pushed into the heavily forested and mountainous Ardennes region of Belgium, creating the bulge in the front for which the resulting battle would be named. ...

 

Patton, in the meantime, had anticipated a German offensive and was prepared to wield his armored forces with the speed and relentlessness he longed for. In just four days, three of his Third Army divisions turned their advance 90 degrees and trekked over 100 miles through ice, snow, and fog—an extraordinary feat for heavy vehicles and exhausted men. Patton’s spearheads arrived at Bastogne on December 26, driving into the flank of the German offensive and reaching the city’s beleaguered defenders. But a lack of cold weather gear and one of the region’s harshest winters hampered subsequent Allied efforts. The German hold on Bastogne finally broke on January 9, 1945; even then, the Germans were not pushed back to their former line until January 30.

Patton’s finest moment was thus lost on the Germans, as the long struggle to reclaim Bastogne overshadowed his lightning-quick arrival.