fair point that
In the picture pages post today, I feel I noted something of some significance. This isn’t supposed to be a post to puff out my own chest, rather, I merely want to give the
other side of the argument my side of the argument for what it really is.
As an aside, there have been numerous people that have constantly misconstrued my argument lately. I understand that by taking a particular unpopular stance so strongly, that I have opened myself up to criticism. But within this article I also want to make clear up some of my stance, so towards the end I will get into some of that. Much of these will be related to the comments I made earlier (if not copy and pasted), the major difference is that I now have the opportunity to add accompanying pictures and diagrams to go with it. This is of importance because football isn’t really a sport that is best described with words. You can try to be as descriptive as possible, but there will always be a certain amount of failure to accurately convey your thoughts through this medium. So the pictures/diagrams help in that regard. So let’s begin.
Set Up and Play Design
I’m going to copy and paste Brian’s set up to his post as he does a good job getting us there.
Michigan comes out with an H-back and two tailbacks in a twins formation, which necessarily means that the slot receiver is not an eligible receiver. Nebraska responds with 7.5 in the box, with the gray area defender just about splitting the difference between Funchess and the tackle.
I’ll get to the covered receiver part later, I want to start off with the basics here about what the intention of this play is. Let’s first start with the most fundamental concept of any run play: the blocking scheme.
Inverted veer works with a Power O blocking scheme. Power is a type of man/gap blocking scheme, while “O” indicates the pulling of the backside guard. A simple power play looks like this.
The inverted veer meanwhile, takes the fullback and erases him. It utilizes the option read to kick out the DE because the DE must commit to the QB or the RB. If the DE commits to the RB, the QB reads this and shoots through the lane inside of him. If the DE commits to the QB, the QB gives to the RB and the RB attacks the edge. Here’s how the inverted veer looks:
Now, let’s first act like there is no FB involved in the play so we can address the offensive line and TE first. As noted, this is a standard power blocking scheme. No one, from any of the offensive linemen, to the TE, do things differently than they would if this was a Power O run from under center. But the defense aligns in a way that makes running power difficult. This is an even front, stacked front, meaning the DL is aligned 5-2-2-5 as far as gaps. That’s outside shoulder of the OT and inside shoulder of the OG. The stack indicates that the OLBs are stacked over the DEs.
Well, to the front side this is similar to what a 4-3 Under will look like, but instead of the LB brought up on the LOS like Michigan often does with Jake Ryan, they’ve stacked him behind the DE.
This isn’t the exact defensive formation, but the blocking scheme is exactly the same (the only difference is the OC has one less shoulder to down block the backside DT and that the LB are shaded further from playside).
If you’re wondering what some of the things are in the diagram, the green boxes are the blocking calls that should be understood or made. As for the defensive formation, just for reference, the “G” means the NT that is usually lined up in a 1-tech slides out to the guards inside shoulder (often utilized to stop Iso) and the Loose is the SAM position loose from the LOS.
What you see is an adjustment in the blocking scheme. This is automatic and should be called and understood. Any team that runs power should make this adjustment. Why? Because that playside DE is very tight to the formation and becomes extremely difficult to kick out. His position pre-snap is already squeezing the hole that power is intended to go through, so rather than slam into that wall, it’s easier to down block him and seal the outside for the RB.
Now, here is how that applies to the inverted veer.
You see now that the person being optioned is that OLB (SAM) rather than the DE because of the defensive alignment.
Now let’s add the FB in the inverted veer. Power blocking makes another small adjustment when you have two lead blockers. If you remember back in the Tackle Over days, Michigan would utilize the U-back as a first lead blocker and a FB as a second. It was the U-back that was first through and responsible for the kick defender. The FB has some reads, but generally will try to get beyond the kick player and knock the first odd color jersey he sees.
More accurately, let’s look at it with an overhang defender. The way the FB is going to treat this is to go block that guy. If that guy tries to gain depth into the backfield, the FB will just carry him with his momentum. If he tries to go inside of him, he’ll simply arch block him. This is what that looks like:
Now let’s apply that to the inverted veer. It’s the same exact thing. The first lead blocker through takes the kick defender (here, that is the playside OLB). The fullback goes and finds the next off color jersey, typically to the outside. Generally, he will block this in a somewhat similar way, erring on the side of scooping the gray area defender. What that does is give a massive alley for Fitz to run through. It also forces that gray area defender to fight that block, regardless of if it blocks him from DG because he knows he must respect Fitz to run. That means if the blocking up front is done properly, DG has more than enough room and time to go straight up field and beyond that gray area defender before cutting out into the same lane that Fitz would run in.
So that’s how the play is designed to be run. Combined with the slot receiver taking the playside safety, everyone on the playside is blocked and a defined seam is established.
Why Run This Play?
I’m not really going to get into why you run the inverted veer, as that’s just a play more or less that has some pretty clear positives as far as reading a defender and threatening a defense with the RB and QB. But why put in the FB?
A common way teams defend the inverted veer is similar to ways that defenses have adapted to defend the read option: they force the QB’s read to be wrong. Essentially, this is a scrape exchange.
In the instance of an inverted veer, they’ll bring a defender off the edge that the QB can’t read or see because the QB is busy reading his key. The key typically is the DE.
Here’s a give look:
Here’s a keep look:
And here’s how a scrape exchange looks:
See that the read is still the same player for the QB. The QB’s read is to give. What the QB doesn’t see is the guy that is coming right into Fitz at the handoff. The defense is making DG’s reads wrong and there is nothing he can do about it.
So, to counter this, you add a FB. This is similar to what Rich Rod did with a U-back to kick the backside on a read option. Essentially, it’s making the QB’s read right by blocking the exchange defender. This means the QB just has to read his key and is fine. This is an adjustment to take advantage of a defensive look and seal the defense inside. Effectively, it’s acting similar to a bubble screen would act as it’s sealing the defense inside and attack the edge and alley with the RB (rather than a slot receiver). It’s a horizontal constraint on top of the normal inverted veer play.
Why Doesn’t it Work?
I’ll save some time and copy and paste a bit:
So the problem is two-fold: Kerridge completely whiffs his block because he archs too wide. His goal is essentially to scoop that gray area defender like he's trying to do in the MSU clip, note in that clip how he passes off the read DE and tries to get to the second level where he blocks no one because the safety he wants to block shot the gap instead (in theory here, his eyes are in the wrong place, there should be some adjustment that allows for DG to read the safety crashing and for Kerridge to scoop the DE, and DG should give here in that instance, but was likely hoping that guy would just follow Fitz and he'd have a clear path to a TD by having the option essentially block two-defenders, but as expected, it doesn't). The second problem is the fact that two people (Schofield and the TE) aren't on the same page as to what the power blocking adjustment should be.
The Big Picture
So we see this is messed up here. It is an execution issue. Alright. So what’s the deal. Quasi-rant in copy and paste mode:
Now, I don't think as far as the missed communication that it's because the blocking scheme is too complex. Much and most of their run scheme settles around a power blocking scheme. That should be better. The play against Nebraska should be executed better, but there were two huge botched assignments. The play against MSU is tougher and something that clearly wasn't repped enough (on the coaches). The FB nor Gardner made the correct adjustment to a safety shooting a gap. They might have repped it a few times, but clearly it wasn't enough to be familiar with how to adjust it in game.
It's basic Power O blocking fundamentals with two lead blockers (here, the two lead blockers are the option read and then the FB rather than a U-back and then a FB).
This is the problem that I've had with the "too many things that they aren't good at anything" argument. Veer option is based on a running scheme they utilize anyway (essentially a down G) but you don't have to pull because your kick block is the option. Inverted veer is Power blocking all the way. It is their base run play with the same exact assignments and adjustements. Nebraska does absolutely nothing that shows this play is tipped, they don't play it any way other than how a standard defense would play it. But Michigan can't get out of it's own way.
And this is the argument that I've had since PSU. It is execution. This play should work. It is 100% execution. Borges has Nebraska exactly how he wants them. Michigan is missing assignments in their base blocking scheme that they've repped thousands of times from under center, from pistol, from ace, from shotgun. That's not just on the players. Why the hell isn't the coaching staff able to get the players to block their base scheme? Why is it taking so long? Youth is part of it, yes. But at this point they should be able to block the run they utilize 75% of the time, including on their counters. It's on the coaches but it's not because of the play call. The play call is perfect. Why the hell aren't the players able to execute? Part of that, a lot of that, is youth. And part and a lot of that is they aren't getting through to these kids. It's the argument that I've made that's been misinterpreted since the start of all this. It's the same thing over and over again. Why can't they block their most basic, most repetitively run play in the entire playbook?
It’s not that there is too much in the playbook, I don’t believe that. That seems like a plausible answer when you isolate inverted veer from the rest of the offense. But it's not isolated from the rest of the offense. It's a Power O play with Gardner making a read. Blocking is exactly the same as Power O. It's their most repped play in the entire playbook.
So how can you make it easier? They've taken out most of the difficult things. 75+% of the runs are the same damn blocking scheme. Counter Power, Inverted Veer, Veer option, Power, that accounts for the vast majority of the plays and all those plays have their roots in the same blocking structure. They still can't get it done. It's not about reducing the playbook anymore, they literally can't without just running from the I formation or just inverted veer. They can literally only reduce it by having the same blocking scheme and the same run action behind it, and that would only make matters worse because blocking is the primary issue.
And I know the execution thing rings of cliché as well, but it is absolutely true. This grab bag theory that all these plays are independent of one another isn't correct. They do have some tweaks. Zone stretch is now intended to be a constraint. Same with the counter. But the base of the run game comes back to power over 75% of the time I can promise that.
So it’s part youth. Certainly youth is a valid reason for some of these issues. But it’s also coaching. I can reiterate that until my face turns blue and some people won’t accept that I said it. But there is a fundamental flaw transferring the knowledge of this scheme to the players. This is not a difficult scheme. It’s a scheme taught to high schoolers all across the country. Sure, it gets a bit more complex at this level, and it gets a lot faster and you have to be much better at executing, but the basic, mental problems?
Why No Vertical Constraint?
Trust me when I say I would like a vertical constraint (pop pass) out of this look as much as anyone. My goal in this section is to try to explain why it may not be in the playbook right now with so many other issues in this offense.
But I seem to remember a pop pass off of it once or twice last year (I believe with Denard at QB). Honestly can't say why Borges hasn't run a false mesh, slide protection pop pass off of this look yet this year. I would like him too as well unless. My guess is that he's uncomfortable with DG making that read in traffic (he's worried about someone undercutting it or scrapping into it is my guess, and DG not processing it fast enough).
This is intended to argue one way or another if that play should be in there (I would personally like it), it's just trying to give perspective on if it's been run before and why an OC may shy away from it.
Why Cover Funchess?
Again, guesses for the most part, but realistically:
As I said, I hate covering receivers. It is a tip to the defense that it's likely run (where, they don't know). That said, you would be surprised how many defenses will still trot a DB out to cover that guy.
Anyway, the reason here is because Borges wanted a guy to block the playside safety. He wanted to form an alley on that side for Fitz. The FB takes the slot defender, Funchess takes the safety, and Gallon takes the CB. Everyone else is sealed inside. That's the only reason he did it, was to get the play completely blocked playside, which it should have been.
They need to cover the TE or Funchess because he wanted to run to strength and wanted that slot blocker. So the TE or Funchess had to be covered. Now, typically I'd say "alright, cover the TE, don't cover your 2nd biggest threat". But a couple things could have gone into the thinking here.
- But have the TE off the line you open up plays to the backside of the formation with the inverted veer look (including counter schemes and how the FB would leak out into the flat later). So in a way, it keeps the box defenders more honest, which they succeeded in doing (they didn't all crash playside on the snap before reading the play).
- They wanted to know what that slot defender was doing. They didn't want to run him off, they want a clear target for the FB. Funchess covered, that guy comes. Maybe that was something they saw on film and were trying to take advantage of. But there's a real possibility that they didn't want to force the FB to read "is that guy going with the WR, do I pick up the filling alley safety or does Funchess, so do I switch to his guy?" etc.
My guess is more #1 than #2, but it depends on what they saw on film.
So what’s the point in all this? Is it to blindly defend Borges? No. The intention isn’t to blindly defend the coaches. The intention is to look at what is happening and figure out where the issue is. Here is a very, very clear example of a bigger picture. It is execution. The coaches aren’t lying about that and it isn’t a copout answer. This is a play where Al Borges got everything he wanted and more from Nebraska. Nebraska, who had a player say they knew every play that was coming, did nothing to stop this play because of any tip or tendency. They stopped it because Michigan can’t get out of their own way. They can’t execute their most basic blocking scheme that they practice and rep more than any other. This points to youth, and this fails to a failure by the coaching staff to adequately teach these players to do one of their most fundamental plays. Both of those are under the execution umbrella.
And this goes beyond this play. This goes to the pass protection schemes. This goes to how I’ve seen veer option blocked. This goes to how every single run play pretty much ever this year is blocked. There are a few players that seem to “get it”, there are some that get it sometimes and not others, and then there are the young or inexperienced that clearly don’t. It’s a fundamental issue that isn’t play calling, it isn’t scheme, it isn’t about huddling or not huddling. It’s not about if you prefer certain screens (I’d like more screens), it’s not about play action or 3-step drops or hot routes. It is as simple as people continuing to fail at doing their jobs. That’s not just calling out the players; that’s also calling out the coaches for putting out a product, for not teaching their students, in a way that allows them to succeed. They are in positions to succeed, probably positions to the best of what they rep day in and day out in practice, but the mental aspect, the thought process, the confidence to know what they are doing without questioning it or doing it wrong is not there. And that is the major failure in this offense right now. This play only exemplifies that.
Last week I posted a rather critical Diary highlighting some of the mistakes of the offensive line.
It’s only fair that, this week, I show some of the things that they did right. Indiana defense caveats apply, and they need to be much more consistent, but they did showed flashes of competency that was sorely missing last week.
Play 1: First play of Michigan’s 2nd drive after going 3 and out to start.
Last week, I highlighted some issues with lineman executing combination blocks. This play features a textbook combo block by one guy and another guy reacting on the fly to something he doesn’t expect before the snap.
Pic1: Michigan lines up in shotgun with one tight end (Funchess) next to Lewan.
Pic2: On the snap, Lewan and Burzinyski double one DT and Magnuson and Glasgow double the other. Schofield handles the DE lined up over him, while Funchess goes out in a route, leaving his DE unblocked and to be optioned off.
Pic3: Glasgow executes his combo perfectly, pushing the defender directly in front of Magnuson and then going out to find the OLB. Lewan and Burzinyski’s guy is a little more trouble as he’s slanting playside. This prevents Burzinyski from getting his release, but he adjusts and tries to keep the guy from getting penetration. Gardner reads the unblocked DE containing the edge so he gives to Fitz.
Pic4: The slanting DT is starting to constrict the hole but Burzinyski (you can just see his helmet peeking out between Lewan and the DT) has fought hard to get playside and seal it. Fitz, for his part, does a nice job getting skinny and squeezing through. The MLB that Burzinyski or Lewan was supposed to pick up has scraped to fill behind the slanting DT and taken himself out of the play (this is where Indiana caveat applies, btw)..
Pic5: Glasgow has a little trouble holding his block but gets one last shove as Fitz gets through before the optioned DE can get his ankles. With nothing but green until the first down line, this goes for 9. 2nd and 1 sure is better than 2nd and 13.
Play 2: Michigan’s 3rd drive, 4th and 1 at the goal line
I also harped on individuals getting beaten 1 v 1, guys not targeting the right defender, and lead blockers not blocking second level defenders cleanly. This play is one where all of these errors were eliminated and everyone does their job, allowing the play to work (almost) just as you would draw it up.
Pic6: Michigan is in jumbo personnel with Lewan, Schofield, Bosch, Glasgow, Kalis, Magnuson, Paskorz across the line, and Butt and Houma in the backfield as lead blockers. Indiana responds with all 11 in the box in 5-4-2 (?). Manball baby.
Pic7: At the snap, a lot of things are happening simultaneously. Live, I thought the interior gets blown up, but it actually looks like pretty good blocking upon closer inspection. Glasgow (helmet peeking out behind Schofield's guy) squeezes through playside of the NT to engage a LB/safety while Kalis pancakes the NT. Magnuson cuts the other DT and impedes the DE lined up over him who Paskorz has no chance on (not sure if intentional, but it works). This forces the DE to vault over Magnuson. Meanwhile, Lewan and Schofield have sealed their guys inside and Bosch pulls to go kick out the OLB.
Pic8: Bosch has kicked the OLB upfield and out of the play. The playside MLB is the only guy that has a shot to make the stop and shuffles down to occupy the hole, but Houma is on his way to meet him. On the backside, Butt runs around Paskorz to engage the backside safety, leaving the backside OLB unblocked because he’s too far away to matter (and he’s responsible for contain on any boot action if Gardner keeps).
Pic9: Luckily, the guy hurdling over Magnuson can’t stay on his feet, otherwise he makes a spectacular play in the backfield. You’d maybe like to see our guys in the middle stay on their feet (especially Kalis), but they do take the first level defenders out of the play and make a giant pile for the second level guys, like the backside MLB, to go around/over.
Pic10: Houma does a nice job hitting the playside MLB in the hole and adeptly pivoting his legs around to seal the MLB to the inside. Compare his positioning between this picture and the previous one. David Molk would be proud. Glasgow, and then Schofield each managed to get out and get enough of second MLB to slow him down before a pile of bodies lands on top of them, so that guy can’t get to Fitz until he’s already in the endzone. Ditto goes for Butt’s guy, who was forced to redirect around him. That’s basically everyone with even a remote chance of executing their block doing so in a hugely chaotic situation with lots of moving pieces. Indiana or not, this is encouraging.
Lastly, after the beating he took he took on the board last week, I have to highlight a couple great calls by the big man upstairs (NTBMU).
The throwback screen (almost) always works, so it’s not really surprised that it worked on a undisciplined Indiana defense. However, the timing of calling this play was a stroke of genius. On the previous play, Indiana had just flushed Gardner out of the pocket, chasing him all over the field and ultimately forcing that intentional grounding that was ruled (correctly) a sack after video review.
Pic11: Michigan is in shotgun with Butt as the H back.
Pic12: At the snap, Michigan rolls the pocket left as protection breaks down. Magnuson’s guy gets away with major illegal hands to the face FWIW, which just sells this even more. Butt gets beat by the DE, while Lewan lets his guy, #96, by untouched.
Pic13: At this point the alarm bells should be ringing in #96’s helmet, but he smells blood in the water after missing out on the sack on the previous play and he wants in on the action. He's still coming full bore as half of Michigan's OL is sneaking off behind him.
Pic14: By the time any of the Indiana guys realize what’s up, it’s too late, Devin lofts a nice touch pass over #96 and Fitz is rumbling down field with a convoy of blockers.
A bit later in the game, after Michigan’s new air raid offense has gone into full effect, Borges calls another good one. Michigan had already victimized Indiana on play action and pop passes a few times at this point. Three plays before this one, Gardner lined up in shotgun and hit Jackson after a quick fake handoff. There was another under center PA play two plays to Gallon two plays before
Pic15: This play, Michigan lines up in a similar, shotgun spread formation to the Jackson reception play.
Pic16: The LBs are justifiably hesitant at the snap after getting the ball thrown over their heads so many times already. A quick pump fake by Gardner, and they both take a step back to drop into coverage.
Pic17: As the hand off is made, you can see the guy on the “M” is in full bug out mode, while the other LB is just sitting flat footed as Reynolds is about to engage him.
Pic18: A couple seconds later, Fitz crosses the LOS with both LBs still 5 yards back and blocked. Profit. It's an easy 10 yards before a safety comes in to tackle.
That's a pretty masterful job of seeing how your performance on previous plays, good and bad, is influencing the defense and calling the right play to stay one step ahead.
(Previously, on Moving Picture Pages: http://mgoblog.com/mgoboard/moving-picture-pages-goofballs-crime-and-punishment)
Video companion to http://mgoblog.com/content/picture-pages-nose-penetration-allowed
Full YouTubeage here
Video rendition of http://mgoblog.com/content/picture-pages-one-step. Analysis courtesy Brian.
All three plays in the 'Ending It' Picture Pages series in one video. Analysis courtesy Brian, per usual.
Video companion to http://mgoblog.com/content/picture-pages-predictability. Analysis courtesy Brian, as usual.
Full YouTube link is http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PPcoRak3NbI