"Though I received no official response to these sophisticated and elegant tweets to the Illini Athletic Department, I would like to think that Beckman spent the evening prank calling everyone in Illinois named George McLellan and then ordering an absurd amount of hats off an internet haberdashery to hoard in his home's hat annex."
Apologies for the tardiness of this post - I meant to post this when the blogpoll came out, but I missed that, then it was the weekend. And there's not much change at the top.
I'll post this week's results after the blogpoll comes out.
Here's the top 20 from last week (through games of 2009.11.22):
|Team||Pvs||+/-||Rank||KRACH||RRWP||Record Rank||W||L||T||Win %||SOS Rank||SOS|
This blog previously considered the question whether or not one should go for it on 4th and goal from the 2. I recall the analysis, among other advantages, showing that, from NFL stats, the chance of making a touchdown (7pts) was about .6, yielding .6*7=4.2 pts on average, which exceeds the score from a made field goal.
Now Bill Belichick is being fried by the talking heads in New England for making a similar decision to go for...but to go for it not on the goal line but in his own territory (30 yd line) on 4th and 2 with 2 minutes left in the game vs IND, who is down by 6pts. Brady's pass was complete but marked inches short when it was bobbled, enabling IND to have a short field (30 yards) to score the winning TD. I know that Belichick's decision to go for it violates intuition and almost universal coaching practice. But was the decision really a mistake, as so many claim?
According to my VERY ROUGH and QUICK calculations and the graphical link below, the chance of NE winning was .68 with the decision to go for it vs. .5 if he decided to punt. So, I think Bill made the right choice. I'd be interested to know if anyone has different opinions about the chances of winning based on the assumptions, I have made below.
Note: Remember that, if NE succeeds on 4th and 2, the game is virtually over as they can run out the clock. I've assumed a 40 yard punt and no unforeseen turnovers. I considered that Peyton Manning had a hot hand, the NE defense was tired, and that IND had a higher than usual chance of making a TD, whether it was from 30 yards out (after NE fails on 4th and 2)(Pr=.8) or 70 yards out (ie after a punt)(Pr=.5).
Summary: NE had a greater chance winning by going for it on 4th and 2 (.68 vs. .5)
Analysis of the 2 possible decisions:
1. NE goes for it P(make 4th and two )=.6 =Chance PATS win immediately
Pr(don’t make 4th and two) = .4
p(Ind TD with 30 yard drive)=.8, Pr(IND does not make TD with 30 yard drive)=.2
Pr(IND fails to make TD on 30 yard drive and Pats fail on 4th and 2)=.2*.4=0.08
TOTAL CHANCE PATS WIN=.6+.08=.68
2. NE punts
Pr(IND TD with 70 yard drive)=.5* Pr(IND fails to score on 70 yard drive)=.5
TOTAL CHANCE PATS WIN=.5
Here's an article on the game decision.http://www.nj.com/sports/ledger/politi/index.ssf/2009/11/new_england_patriots_coach_bil.html
Much has been made of the recent UM record. However, whenf statisticians seek a more reliable measure of a team’s quality and the direction of a program, they look at the bigger picture by (1) comparing that season record with records from other schools and (2) considering not a single year, but groups of years (called a moving average).
(1) I looked at the records of the two most recent coaches among our rivals. I found that ND had a 3 win season, OSU had a four win season; and MSU had three four-win seasons. Some of these occurred during coaching transitions, like UM’s. But others had no such excuse.http://cid-4bf9d75c782b05b1.skydrive.live.com/self.aspx/notre%20dame%20trends/ND+trends+vs+UM.jpg
(2) As in prior threads (see footnote*), I now report the analysis of the records of the ND coaches, based on the victories averaged over each of 4 successive seasons.**
Results: Under Lou Holz, the trend was positive overall (with an increase of .125 victories per year). Yet, much as occurred during LC’s initial years, the gains were all early, and were followed by a gradual decline. For all the subsequent coaches at ND, the trends were consistently negative (a decrease in average victories of -.25 per season for Davies, -.25 per season for Willingham, -.10 per season for Weiss. However, the trends appear downward at a uniform rate, starting at Holtz’s peak.
1. The ND program is progressively deteriorating.
2. One wonders if the many coaching changes
contributed to this. I have given mixed
shades to the transition years, in which one coach has at least 2 years of the
other one’s players. From this, one
wonders whether Willingham would have continued the upward trend if he was kept
and could play his recruits during what were the first two years of Weiss’
3. Since ND faces massive losses next year, including the OL, RB and probably Clausen and Tate, in addition, with a completely inexperienced backup QB who will be unable to practice and coming off ACL surgery next August, one must seriously wonder when—no, whether—the ND program will get back on track.
If UM uses ND as an example of what might happen to a program, the questions for UM now is whether it will follow the pattern of Holtz, who began with a decline in average wins—similar to what is likely for RR (although Holtz did not have the big immediate dropoff in average wins from his predecessor, since that average was already quite low). The promising thing is that, unlike ND, UM has more, not less, starters coming back for the next two years. Clearly, it’s way too early to tell—as Brian has intimated today—but I can't help worrying that we might end up like ND if we keep getting rid of coaches before they can build their program.
* In two previous threads titled “Reasons for Hope” (for UM), and “reasons for MSU hopelessness.” Another interesting and pertinent link from another poster is: http://mgoblog.com/diaries/what-two-losing-seasons-start-tenure-means**Note that it’s not a simple average. At the beginning of a coach's tenure, his record is shown as an average that includes the prior coach's average--which may be either better or worse than the current record. As, such the first two years of each coach’s tenure are shown as mixed colors, as they reflect the recruits of the previous coach as well as the performance of the current coach. (just ask yourself, if Bo were alive and took over the coaching job of the perennial celler-dweller Northwestern team in the 60's, would he be responsible for the first few years?)
In a previous thread titled “Reasons for Hope” (for UM), I looked at the trends in average victories from LC to RR (based on an average of four consecutive years). The conclusion was: that RR--after a significant hemorrhage that occurred during his first year of surgery on the program--is close to stopping the slow bleeding that actually began after LC's first three years.
One critic objected in a heated manner to the methods I used. A few posters rebutted the critic, pointing out that his tunnel vision of only the worst possible portion of UM’s recent record ignored the bigger picture. I will not speculate on the motivations for this tunnel vision. However, one supportive poster--whom I thank-- suggested looking at the record of MSU compared to UM. So, taking this excellent suggestion, I tried using similar methods to look at the trends in average win pct at MSU under various head coaches.
I found that under Nick Saban, the trend in average victories was positive (with an increase of .06 victories per year, much as occurred during LC’s initial years). But after that, the trends were consistently negative (a decrease of .17 victories per year under Williams and Smith and a decrease of .25 victories per year under Mark Dantonio).* So, MSU declined at a pretty steady rate.
The only way that Dantonio can stop the bleeding and just stay even with the average victory record of his esteemed predecessor, John Smith, is to win 2 out of the 3 next games. So, this analysis does not support the often voiced idea—some will call it wishful thinking—that MSU has turned the program around under MD.
To stop the bleeding (decline in average), RR also needs to become bowl eligible (winning 2 out of the next 4 games including a bowl). To be fair, however, his task is much more formidable. UM’s current average, which is at a low point for UM during this period (7.5 victories per season) is still 3 victories per season more than MSU’s average (4.5).
Methods of Analysis (repeated)
I looked at the trends since Saban took over in 1995 (based on a moving average involving each four year period).
Toal wins and average wins for four successive seasons beginning in 1995 to present.
1995 6.5, 6, 7, 6 avg 6.25 Nick Saban trend +.06 per year
1996 6, 7, 6, 10 avg 7.25
1997 7, 6, 10,5 avg 7.0
1998 6, 10,5,7 avg 7.0
1999 10,5,7,4 avg 6.5
2000 5,7,4,8 avg 6.0 Bobby Williams -.17 per year
2001 7,4,8,5 avg 6.25
2002 4,8,5,5 avg 5.5
2003 8,5,5,4 avg 5.5 John Smith -.17 per year
2004 5,5,4,7 avg 5.5
2005 5,4,7, 5 avg 5.5
2006 4,7, 5,4 avg 5.0
2007-8 5,4 avg 4.5 until Mark Dantonio only -.25 per year (not including this year)
5,4,6 avg 5.0 -0.0 per year (assuming two more victories = 6 total this year)
*considering only his complete seasons---only if we assume he gets two more victories this year does he stay even with John Smith’s average when Smith left.
There's been plenty said on just how bad the third down defense has been, and I thought I'd chronicle that for you. For starters, our NCAA rank is currently #66 out of 120 FBS teams when it comes to overall defensive 3rd down conversion percentage (how often the opposing offense succeeds). We are listed at 38.78% with 38 conversions in 98 attempts.
From going over box scores, I found only 97, so note that discrepancy now. I'm not worried about one missing right now. Also worth noting, I used ESPN's box scores, not Brian's UFRs. So that may cause discrepancy if you go back and check plays there.
I'm not going to offer much more than interesting stats in this. I'll let you guys draw your own conclusions and leave them in the comments. Any thoughts or explanations are welcome.
So let's take a look at the different third down plays the defense has gone up against by yardage:
|Yards To Go||Conversions||Attempts||Percentage|
There's obviously a couple outliers out there. The 3rd and 18/24 plays against MSU and Iowa respectively definitely throw a wrench in the numbers. The number that is the most disturbing, though, has to the 3rd and 6 metric. Let's take a slightly closer look at that:
|WMU||3||6||pass||23||Fly play where a blanketing Warren dives and WR comes up with it|
|EMU||3||6||rush||13||Brown misreads zone read with running qb|
|EMU||3||6||pass||12||Umbrella coverage, missed tackle|
|EMU||3||6||rush||-4||2nd team scrubs were in|
|Indiana||3||6||rush||0||Rollout pass turned scramble for no gain.|
|Indiana||3||6||pass||18||3-man rush, as hit, throws skinny post against Mouton for 15 yards|
|MSU||3||6||pass||0||Stevie Brown Interception |
|MSU||3||6||pass||9||Crossing under routes confuses our LBs|
|MSU||3||6||pass||15||Woolfolk stares down QB in man coverage instead of WR. Misses route. Misses tackle to allow 1st|
|MSU||3||6||pass||0||Blitz house, man open but thrown wide|
|IOWA||3||6||pass||10||Curl short of the two guys we have deep on that side. Warren backed off presnap.|
|IOWA||3||6||pass||33||Pumpfake by Stanzi to a laid out Stross on a fly-ish route.|
Other than that pick and the four yard TFL against EMU by the scrubs, that's horrid. It doesn't seem to be laid squarely on blitzing too many, umbrella coverage, or anything in particular.
When you throw in those really long conversions, it looks pretty ugly. So what do you have to compare these numbers to? I've got two things. Brian did some extensive DIY Third Down Efficiency studies during the first few years of his blog, something he hopes to return to in the future, IIRC. There you can see that the normal conversion rate on a 3rd and 1 is ~68% (2007 statistics I believe). Michigan is outdoing that by about 7% on defense.
As you move down that trend line, however, you can see Michigan starts to approximate that line really quickly, then the extremely long conversions start to skew the results.
Also, we can look at how Michigan has done against opposing defenses.
|Yards To Go||Conversions||Attempts||Percentages|
As you can see, Michigan is doing much more poorly on offense when it comes to converting on third down. That said, we're also much better on converting on short yardage. When we get within 4 yards, we've got a very high percentage chance of converting.
Going back to the D for a minute, one of the other problems I'm noticing is how much worse we are on 1st and 2nd down. I'm not sure of too many metrics to gauge this, so I thought about a way to get a decent metric on this. While the standard 3 yards per play average will be fairly successful, it's probably not the best way to describe how successful you are. I decided to go with an arbitrary metric of half the distance needed instead. So, for example, if it's 1st and 10, 5 yards would be considered a successful pick up. So on a 2nd and 5, a 2.5 yard pick up would leave you with 3rd and 2 or 3. I would argue if you're able to do this, you'd probably be slightly more successful than just averaging three yards per snap.
I'll admit this metric is just my opinion, and I welcome ideas for a better way to measure success on 1st and 2nd down.
So with my metric in mind, here's the type of stats I'm seeing.
While Michigan does a decent job of stopping a team on 1st down, about 40.9%, second downs, Michigan is quite a bit worse on second down, around 53.8%. This is understandable as you generally need less yardage on 2nd down while still getting about the same number of yards. To explain, Michigan averages a 1st and 10.38 and gives up an average of 5.807 yards. Meanwhile, one second down, they average 2nd and 8.41 and give up an average of 5.629. The opposing team gains between 5-6 yards per play [ed. -cringe] on both first and second downs, while in my metric, they should need less.
I guess, if anything is good news, on third down, we face an average of 3rd and 6.56 and hold an average of 5.18 yards per play, over half a yard less per play than 1st or 2nd down.
I'll probably be playing with these stats a bit more in the next few days. Unfortunately, most of my stats don't involve personnel, so that complicates things.
Things We Know This is obvious territory: the Spread's "Score whenever possible" mentality renders T.O.P. moot as a way to tell which team was playing better at the end of the game. Thing is, T.O.P. was never meant to be an in-game metric, or shouldn't have been. It's an IN-GAME metric. The idea isn't to show who's dominating the game, but what shape the defense is in. Its continued popularity on networks is likely due to the ease with which it's calculated. I think we can come up with a much better metric for that, and retire T.O.P. Good guesses:
- Offenses tire less quickly than defenses. Giving blocks is better than receiving them. Reacting to a play that you didn't call puts you at a disadvantage. Pushing past a lineman to the one place he doesn't want you to is more tiresome than shoving one (a lineman) back from the one direction you know he wants to go to. There's a lot of chasing involved.
- Players recover from being tired in real time (not Game Time)
- Fatigue is generated during plays, not between them
- Greater fatigue reduces the effectiveness of a defense because a) tired players can't react as well, and b) substitutions are inherently a reduction of the talent put on the field.
- While fatigue can be recovered from during the game, the more that is drained, the lower the maximum recoverable energy.
Things We'd Like to Know I want a metric that:
- Gives an approximate likelihood of the offense scoring based on defensive fatigue.
- Since the above would be very difficult, the metric should at least standardize defensive fatigue, to be used as a reference point
- Is fairly easy to calculate with widely available stats
Pure guesses (opportunities for me to look stupid):
- Energy is recovered at an exponential (logistic? Math majors help! -- i mean a curve that slows as it goes, or y=x^[fraction]) rate.
- More plays depletes a defense's performance
- More plays in progression depletes a defense's performance faster
- Available statistics allow us to create a metric for a defense's performance based off of these fatigue factors
Let's Talk Variables It's hard to count actual time during plays, at least for us laymen. However, number of plays per drive is easy to calculate. I would like to count plays that are replayed due to penalties unless it is blown dead. I'd like to count overall time elapsed since the last defensive play.
However, actual time is hard to come by. We have the time the game took to play. We have the in-game time. But short of having a DVR with a timer, I haven't been able to find any real time metric. If someone can find me a place where that is kept and freely accessible, I will use it. Otherwise, we're going to have to ignore regeneration based on real time.
The atom for all of this is going to be plays run from scrimmage.
Defensive plays from scrimmage increase defensive fatigue. Offensive plays from scrimmage decreases defensive fatigue. Since they use so many backups, special teams plays do not count.
The test for it will be yards given up, since scoring equates too much with field position. Why yards? Because we know that yards gained and winning are correlated. A defense that gives up more yards is more likely to be scored on.
Needs a name. For now: SCHWING.
Defensive SCHWING: How it Works What we will create is a basically running play counter:
- Higher number indicates higher level of defensive fatigue
- Defensive plays count for +3 for the defensive team
- Offensive plays count for -8% for the team on offense
- No team can go into negative.
- Commercial Breaks, Time Outs and Reviews count for -15% for both teams
- Half Time reduces all fatigue by 80 percent (rounded to nearest integer)
The Spreadsheet is here. Click on each image for full size
Michigan vs. Western Michigan:
Averages: Michigan 21, Notre Dame 17
Michigan vs. Eastern Michigan:
Averages: Michigan 21, EMU 14
Remember, higher is bad. It means that Eastern Michigan, over the course of the game, faced a Michigan defense operating, maybe at like 79 percent of its capacity, because of fatigue, while Michigan faced EMU's at, say, 86 percent capacity.
Keep in mind, it's impossible to be 100 percent the whole time. But notice how much better Michigan's defense was against Western, who's not much more talented than Eastern Michigan. There's a big difference in how well the Wolverines let the defense rest in Game 1, whereas they were considerably harder on the D in Games 2 and 3, whether by turnovers or quick scores.
So....Correlation?If Michigan's defense gives up more yards when its SCHWING level is high, that would indicate the metric works, right?
Notre Dame de South Bend:
The yellow lines are offensive plays. The ones sticking out below were negatives (or holding penalties).
Michigan gave up 236 yards (5.02 yards per play) to Eastern when our SCHWING level was 20 or higher. We gave up 61 yards (2.26 yards per play) when it was 19 or lower.
It was actually more drastic than that. A lot of short yardage was given up in the 2nd half against the backups in soft, clock-killing defense. The big plays in the first half were all during high-SCHWING periods. The 3-and-outs were during low ones.
Against Notre Dame, Michigan gave up 188 yards (6 yards per play) 2 with a SCHWING under 20. Not good. We gave up 294 yards (6.125 yards per play) when SCWING was over 20. Also not good. There wasn't as much SCHWING variance, however, against Notre Dame as there was against EMU. The Wolverine defense played much more of that game tired. If you take out the 27 yards on the last play, our SCHWING under 20 YPP goes down to 5.37 (161 yards). I think that just says ND's offense was pretty good (or held like bitches).
WMU was the opposite. With SCHWING under 20, the Broncos put up 81 yards (2.79 YPP). When SCHWING went over 20, they put up 222 yards (6.17 YPP). If I excise the 73-yard TD, it's still 4.26 YPP. But it shouldn't be excised -- that happened near the peak of Michigan's defensive fatigue during the game.
Here's what yardage against us looked like against WMU as SCHWING went up:
As the season progresses, I'll do more plotting to see if this sticks, but so far this seems a little bit correlative. If I had to guess, I'd say ND and their max-protect-bomb strategy caused the difference.
All told, when Michigan's SCHWING was under 20 this year, our defense gave up 330 yards (3.79 YPP). When it was over 20, we gave up 752 yards (5.74 YPP).
I'm sure we could play around with the factors, but as a very basic statistic, it seems to be fairly predictive. When the defensive fatigue rating for a given team is high, they are likely to give up more yards, in our extremely small sample of course. Feel free to plug in other games from years past.
Obviously, scores come after drives.
The thing to look at isn't the end of drives, but the start of them: what shape is the defense in as Team X gets the ball. For example, when Michigan put up three quick scores on Western, they got the ball each time with WMU's defensive deficiency rating already well over 20.
Similarly, EMU got the ball down 38-17 and had a magnificent drive (which should have been a TD), but every drive before that in the 2nd half, Michigan's D started under 10. The real backbreaker for them was when the QB buckled and fumbled -- that gave Michigan the ball back with EMU's defensive SCHWING over 20.
Couple things jumped out, though. The quick scores (Brown's long TD run, the kick return for TD against Notre Dame, Denard's existence) were answered with scores against Michigan, or long periods of scoring drought. Interceptions, too, created a fast turnaround. Look at Stonum's return: not only did it put Michigan back on the field after a tough stop (helped by Cheeseburger Charlie's inability to get a few plays called in*), but even more it helped the Domers' defense rest away the effect of that good early drive by Michigan.
Note how different this is from Time of Possession. By basically counting plays back and forth, we can see when one team or another is particularly likely to get scored on.
I think I'm gonna keep using this as the season progresses. It's pretty easy to calculate, especially if you have the spreadsheet handy. If it holds up as a decent indicator of expected defensive performance, maybe an addition to the UFR charting?
UPDATE 9/23:Bad news. I ran all of the plays from all three games (by ND, EMU, WMU and MICH) and there's such a small correlation it's almost not worth it:
Of course, it's not conclusive. Wait until we have at least 1,000 plays from scrimmage to analyze (we're at about 450 right now).
When SCHWING was 20 or over, offenses gained 1363 yards on 251 plays, and had 23 "big" plays (15 yards or more). That's 5.45 YPP, and 9.16% chance of a big play.
When SCHWING was under 20, offenses gained 984 yards on 175 plays, with 15 big plays. That's 5.67 YPP, and 8.57% chance of a big play.
Not exactly correlating.
One thing of note: Carlos Brown's 90-yard scamper came at a SCHWING level of 17. In fact, a lot of big plays took place around a SCHWING level of 17 to 25. I don't know that that means exactly, except perhaps that's early in drives but seldom right at the start of them. Or that 17 to 25 is the bell curve. This could simply be because early in drives there's more field to go, thus more space for big yardage.
Situationally, there was a small difference. With SCWHING under 20, 26.55% of plays from scrimmage resulted in a 1st down or touchdown. When SCHWING was over 20, that number rose to a 31.62% conversion rate. The touchdown ratio went way up: 7.11% over 20, and 1.69% under 20. But I can't tell you how much of that is field position -- the likelihood of scoring goes up when you get closer to the end zone, and SCHWING goes up the longer a drive lasts, meaning high SCHWING generally takes place deep in an opponent's zone. So the TD ratio means pretty much nil. Anyway, the average SCHWING level before plays that resulted in 1st downs and touchdowns was about 24; the level before plays that didn't convert was 22. Small difference.
I'm not giving up just yet, though. I'm gonna track a few more games, because I think I'm getting thrown off by big plays late in the WMU and EMU games, when backups and whatnot were in (high SCHWING is supposed to necessitate more backups, so if the backups go in when SCHWING is low, that changes things).
Here's the big plays with Low SCHWING this year:
|40||WMU||17||WMU||43||TD||(1st and 15) Robinson, D. rush for 43 yards to the WMU0, 1ST DOWN MICH, TOUCHDOWN, clock 03:57.|
|3||ND||6||MICH||24||1ST||(2nd and 9) ALLEN rush for 24 yards to the ND45, 1ST DOWN ND (Williams, Mike).|
|6||ND||15||MICH||24||1ST||(3rd and 4) CLAUSEN pass complete to RUDOLPH for 24 yards to the MICH25, 1ST DOWN ND (Williams, Mike).|
|24||ND||19||ND||40||1ST||(3rd and 12) Forcier, Tate pass complete to Mathews, Greg for 40 yards to the ND41, 1ST DOWN MICH (WALLS).|
|37||ND||19||MICH||19||1ST||(2nd and 6) CLAUSEN pass complete to ALLEN for 19 yards to the MICH22, 1ST DOWN ND.|
|86||ND||14||ND||24||1ST||(2nd and 14) Forcier, Tate pass complete to Stonum, Darryl for 24 yards to the 50 yardline, 1ST DOWN MICH (McCARTHY, K.).|
|100||ND||17||ND||16||1ST||(1st and 10) Minor, Brandon rush for 16 yards to the ND33, 1ST DOWN MICH (McCARTHY, K.).|
|129||ND||10||MICH||15||1ST||(1st and 10) PENALTY MICH pass interference (Cissoko, B.) 15 yards to the ND19, 1ST DOWN ND.|
|205||ND||11||MICH||27||1ST||(1st and 10) CLAUSEN pass complete to TATE for 27 yards to the ND47, 1ST DOWN ND (Floyd, J.T.).|
|9||EMU||3||EMU||30||1ST||(1st and 10) Brown, Carlos rush for 30 yards to the EMU21, 1ST DOWN MICH (CARDWELL, Marty).|
|51||EMU||10||EMU||26||1ST||(1st and 10) Forcier, Tate pass complete to Odoms, M. for 26 yards to the EMU43, 1ST DOWN MICH (MAY, Chris).|
|54||EMU||19||EMU||22||1ST||(3rd and 1) Shaw, Michael rush for 22 yards to the EMU12, 1ST DOWN MICH (SEARS, Johnny).|
|63||EMU||17||EMU||90||TD||(1st and 10) Brown, Carlos rush for 90 yards to the EMU0, 1ST DOWN MICH, TOUCHDOWN, clock 07:15.|
|156||EMU||18||EMU||36||TD||(1st and 10) Robinson, D. rush for 36 yards to the EMU0, 1ST DOWN MICH, TOUCHDOWN, clock 07:14.|
|175||EMU||11||EMU||24||1ST||(1st and 10) Cox, Michael rush for 24 yards to the EMU41, 1ST DOWN MICH (PALSROK, Tyler).|
Three of those plays are garbage time (205 ND, 156 and 175 EMU). One is Shoelace's incredible Yakety Sax Moon Run. Another is Carlos Brown's 90-yard run. Three more are big plays against EMU's defense. The rest are plays from the Notre Dame game, which, like, they have a great offense.
This isn't nearly enough to put SCHWING back on the map. But they're certainly opportunities for SCHWING to look stupid.
* Weis: "It's MMFFPHHHI-RIMMMFGHT MMMPHTWINS!"
Jimmah: "What coach?!?"
Weis: "I MMMFFFPHH SAID RUNMMMMPHHH ISO MMPPPHHH RIHMMMMPPHH"
Jimmah: "Coach, I can't hear you! Take the ham sandwich out!"
Weis: "I MMMPPHHFFF RIMMMPPHHHHHHFFF SPLMMMMPHHFFF DAMMIT!"
Jimmah: "Dammit, coach? What? What? Dammit -- TIME OUT"